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 1 Introduction
Banking is risky business, and the bankruptcy of banks is a real possibility. When banks
fail they default on at least part of their liabilities. Although there has been deposit in-
surance and the insurance coverage was raised from $100,000 to $250,000 in October 2008
in the United States, a large amount of bank liabilities remain uninsured. For example,
large-denomination certi￿cates of deposits (CDs) are normally issued in $1 million pieces,
well exceeding any deposit insurance limit. It is the interest rates on these uninsured
liabilities that determine the marginal cost of external ￿nance for banks. To compensate
for the possibility of default, banks￿liability holders (depositors1 henceforth for ease of
exposition) require a premium on their funds over default-free securities, giving rise to
interest spreads between, say, CDs, and Treasury bills (T-bills). The recent Global Fi-
nancial Crisis (GFC) calls attention to the importance of banking risks and the frictions
present in the bank-depositor relationship. From 2001Q1 to 2007Q2, the spread between
3-month CD rate and the 3-month T-bill rate was as low as 27 basis points per annum
on average. For the second half of 2007 and the year of 2008 this spread rose to as high
as 153 basis points per annum on average, with a spike at 252 basis points in the last
quarter of 2008 (Figure 1a).2 The rise in this spread partly re￿ ected the rising likelihood
of bankruptcy of banks. In 2005 and 2006, the number of failed FDIC insured ￿nancial
institutions was simply zero. The number, in contrast, was 3 in 2007, 30 in 2008, and 148
in 2009 (Figure 1b).3
1It should be clari￿ed that in this paper we use the term ￿deposits￿in the broadest sense, referring
to all liabilities of banks that are held by the private sector. Meanwhile, we lump all the private-sector
creditors of banks, including consumers, non￿nancial businesses, and nonbank ￿nancial ￿rms, into a single
category of agents called ￿depositors￿ .
2Data source: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
3Source: FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=1934&EndYear=2010&State=1.
1[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
In this paper we develop a model of banking frictions, where stochastic changes in the
riskiness of banking a⁄ect the economy￿ s employment and output. By banking frictions
we mean the asymmetric information and agency problem on the liability side of the
bank balance sheet, that is, between banks and their lenders (depositors). The literature
on ￿nancial market imperfections has so far focused on what we call ￿credit frictions￿ ￿
the agency problem on the asset side of the bank balance sheet, that is, between banks
and their borrowers, eg., entrepreneurs. See the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and a large literature that follows4. To introduce banking frictions we extend the
costly-state-veri￿cation (CSV) framework of Towsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985),
and Williamson (1986, 1987) to a two-sided ￿nancial contracting framework. In our model
banks face idiosyncratic risks and depositors have to expend monitoring costs in order to
verify banks￿capacities to repay, just like banks themselves have to incur such costs in
order to verify entrepreneurs￿revenues. If the banks are subjected to risks that cannot
be fully diversi￿ed, then the kind of agency problem between banks and entrepreneurs
applies equally well to the relationship between banks and depositors. In that case there
are needs to ￿monitor the monitor,￿in the terminology of Krasa and Villamil (1992a).
In our environment the optimal ￿nancial contract is a two-sided debt contract, which
features equilibrium default by both the entrepreneurs and banks. The overall ￿nancial
frictions that are relevant for the determination of equilibrium employment and output are
summarized by a ￿nancial friction indicator, which itself is a function of the entrepreneurs
and banks￿default thresholds as speci￿ed by the contract.
4Examples include Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Fisher (1999),
and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2005, 2009), etc.
2We capture the extent of banking riskiness by a dispersion parameter in the distrib-
ution of banks￿idiosyncratic risks and allow this parameter to be subjected to stochas-
tic disturbances. This formulation parallels the formulation of entrepreneurial riskiness
shocks in the earlier work of Williamson (1987) and the recent work of Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2003, 2009). These authors consider the CSV problem between banks and
entrepreneurs but not the problem between banks and depositors. In the inspiring work of
Williamson (1987), savers delegate monitoring of entrepreneurs to a large ￿nancial inter-
mediary, which perfectly diversi￿es away all of the credit risks and is able to guarantee the
depositors a risk-free return. There are thus agency costs between the entrepreneurs and
the ￿nancial intermediary, but no such costs between the ￿nancial intermediary and the
depositors. In that environment stochastic changes in the riskiness of the entrepreneurs￿
projects generate aggregate ￿ uctuations, ￿ uctuations that would not obtain were there no
costly monitoring on the outcomes of the entrepreneurial projects. In his model, however,
banking frictions (i.e., agency costs between ￿nancial intermediaries and depositors) are
absent, leaving no role for stochastic changes in banking riskiness to play. This abstrac-
tion might be innocuous for episodes where banking frictions are not severe enough to
deserve attention. Yet the experience of the GFC pinpoints the importance of banking
frictions and stochastic changes in the riskiness of banking. As Figure 1a indicates, dur-
ing the GFC there was a sharp increase in the spread between the bank CD rate and
the T-bill rate, but not in the spread between the bank lending rate and the CD rate,
suggesting that banking riskiness shocks might be more important than entrepreneurial
riskiness shocks for the turmoil the ￿nancial and real sectors of the economy recently went
through.
3What are the ￿nancial and macroeconomic consequences of shocks to banking riski-
ness? The answer to this question hinges on the way the ￿nancial friction indicator￿ a
su¢ cient statistic for the determination of employment￿ responds to the shocks. The
way the indicator responds, in turn, depends on the prevailing risk sharing arrangements
among the depositors. In our model two polar risk sharing models are considered. In the
￿rst model there is no risk sharing so that the depositors, endowed with a logarithmic
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, remain risk averse with respect to banking
risks (the log form simpli￿es the analysis by a great deal). In the second model there is
perfect risk sharing so that the depositors are in e⁄ect risk neutral with respect to banking
risks. An important point to notice is that with imperfect risk sharing the response of
the ￿nancial friction indicator and hence employment includes both a pure default e⁄ect
and a risk e⁄ect, while with perfect risk sharing only the pure default e⁄ect is present.
The pure default e⁄ect stems from the fact that the optimal contract dictates equilibrium
bankruptcy of banks, the rate of which depends on the extent of banking riskiness. This
e⁄ect will be present as long as the banks￿default rate changes with the shock, even when
the depositors are risk neutral. The risk e⁄ect results from the fact that the payment
streams under the optimal contract are uncertain for the depositors. This e⁄ect obtains
when risk sharing among the depositors is imperfect so that they remain risk averse with
respect to banking risks.
Taking the imperfect risk sharing model to be the ￿true￿model (perfect risk sharing
seems to be less realistic), we propose a model-based approach to decompose the overall
e⁄ect of a banking riskiness shock into the pure default e⁄ect and the risk e⁄ect. Speci￿-
cally, two measures are developed to assess these e⁄ects: a within-model measure and a
4between-model measure. The within-model measure relies on using the equilibrium de-
fault thresholds prevailing in the ￿true￿model, while the between-model measure takes
into account the fact that with the same realization of banking riskiness shock the equi-
librium default thresholds will vary from one model to the other. A quantitative exercise
is carried out to evaluate the default e⁄ect versus the risk e⁄ect. We ￿nd that bench-
marked to the mean level of riskiness, the pure default e⁄ect of a banking riskiness shock
contributes about 73% to the overall e⁄ect according to the within measure, and about
77% according to the between measure. When the shock generates a bank spread similar
in value to the peak during the GFC, the overall e⁄ect is a decline in employment by 6:57
percent. According to our decomposition, the pure default e⁄ect leads to a 4:76 percent
employment decline by the within measure, and a 5:05 decline by the between measure.
On the other hand, the risk e⁄ect produces a 1:81 percent employment decline by the
within measure, and a 1:52 percent decline by the between measure. Although the pure
default e⁄ects are quantitatively more important, the risk e⁄ects are not to be neglected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model￿ the
economic environment, the two-sided ￿nancial contracting framework, and the general
equilibrium. Section 3 introduces banking riskiness shocks and proposes our model-based
approach to decompose their ￿nancial and macroeconomic impacts into pure default ef-
fects and risk e⁄ects. Quantitative evaluations of these e⁄ects are also presented. The
last section o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
52 The Model
2.1 The Environment
There are four types of agents in the economy￿ saver/depositors, bankers, entrepreneurs,
and workers. Entrepreneurs own the production technologies and operate the ￿rms. They
need to hire labor from the workers but are short of funds in paying the wage bills if they
do not borrow from the banks in advance. Banks, which are run by the bankers, in turn
secure funds from the saver/depositors to ￿nance their lending activities. The ￿nancial
contracting problem is thus two-sided: Banks sign loan contracts with the ￿rms and
deposit contracts with the depositors.
To simplify the analysis, we a consider a two-period setup.5 Production uses capital
and labor and takes place only in period 1. We assume that each ￿rm owns the same
￿xed amount of physical capital Kf, and that each bank owns the same ￿xed amount
Kb. There is a competitive rental market with rental rate Rk. And the rental income of
capital constitutes the ￿rms and banks￿internal funds.6 Since the ￿rms￿internal funds
are generated entirely from the current rental value of the capital stock they own, in
a market clearing equilibrium the ￿rms must borrow additional funds to ￿nance their
purchase of labor inputs supplied by the workers plus the rental services provided by
5An in￿nite-horizon version of the model is presented in Zeng (2010), who assumes perfect risk sharing
among the depositors so that they are e⁄ectively risk-neutral with respect to banking risks. This assump-
tion allows for the usage of a representative-household setup when characterizing the saving behavior.
In the present paper we allow for the possibility of imperfect risk sharing. With imperfect risk sharing,
agents receiving di⁄erent shocks will end up with di⁄erent levels of wealth. Here we choose to work with
the two-period, rather than in￿nite-horizon, setup in order to avoid the di¢ culty of keeping track of the
distribution of money balances across the risk-averse depositors, which would complicate the analysis
without adding much more insight.
6As there is no production activity in period 2, the act of con￿scating the borrowers￿physical capital
in the event of default is of no value to the lenders. Hence the changes in the price of capital are not
potential sources of changes in the net worth of the borrowers in our model. Note that the ￿xity of capital
stock does not prevent it from generating variable internal funds as the rental rate reacts to shocks to
the economy.
6the stock of physical capital owned by the banks. The paper thus emphasizes working
capital ￿nancing as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). Our model di⁄ers from theirs
in that ￿nancial frictions are in￿ icted on the ￿rms￿purchases of labor inputs in the present
setting, giving rise to a ￿nancially distorted labor market.
At the beginning of period 1, the agents are endowed with initial purchasing powers,
i.e., money balances of given amounts. Let the money balance be Md for each depositor,
Mb for each bank, and Mw for each worker (for simplicity assume that the ￿rms do not
possess any initial money balances). The total amount of money balances is then M ￿
Md + Mb + Mw. There is a risk-free government bond of zero supply. The gross interest
rate on this bond, i.e., the risk-free rate, is pegged by the government and normalized to
be one.
The funds in this economy circulate in the following way. First, the sum of Md and Mb
is channelled by the banks and goes to the ￿rms to purchase labor L in the competitive




The sum then becomes labor income at the hands of the workers. The workers use WL
plus their initial money balances Mw to purchase consumption goods C1 at price level P1.
That is, P1C1 = WL + Mw. Substituting (1) into this budget equation, we obtain the
quantity equation:
P1C1 = M: (2)
7The loan market clearing condition takes the form (1) because the ￿rms￿rental payment on capital
is covered by the rental value of the stock of capital owned by the ￿rms and banks. It remains that their
wage bills are to be ultimately ￿nanced by the after-transfer money balances of the banks and depositors.






This simpli￿es to (1) since K = Kf + Kb.
7The sum of money M is received by the ￿rms as revenues. It is then divided among the
￿rms, banks, and depositors according to the ￿nancial contracts and carried over by these
agents to period 2 to purchase consumption goods. We assume that there are output
endowments in period 2 given by C2 > 0. The period-2 price level is thus P2 = M=C2.
At the end of period 2, all of the money stock M retires. Figure 2 illustrates the ￿ ow of
funds in the model.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
The workers work and consume only in period 1. They have constant marginal rate
of substitution between leisure and consumption, given by ￿ > 0. Hence the real wage
rate W=P1 simply equals ￿. We treat them as being risk neutral since they do not face
any idiosyncratic uncertainty at all: They always receive the full payment of wages since
the ￿rms are required to deliver this payment before labor can be provided. In contrast,
the depositors, bankers, and entrepreneurs, who for simplicity only consume in period 2,
all face idiosyncratic uncertainty. We assume that the bankers and entrepreneurs are risk
neutral, but the depositors are risk averse, with logarithmic von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function (this functional form simpli￿es the analysis by a great deal when risk
sharing among the depositors is imperfect). In the ￿nancial relationships among these
three parties, the banks face the possibility of default by the ￿rms that borrow from them,
and the depositors face the possibility of default by the banks where they made deposits.
Note that the distribution of purchasing powers in period 1 (the relative fractions
of Md and Mb in M) a⁄ects the terms of ￿nancial contracts negotiated, which in turn
a⁄ects the quantity of labor input and output produced in that period. The terms of
￿nancial contracts also determine the division of ￿rm revenues M among the contracting
8parties and hence the distribution of period-2 purchasing powers (claims on period-2
consumption goods) among the depositors, bankers, and entrepreneurs. Hence to put it
in a di⁄erent way, the division of surplus (in the form of future consumption) as dictated
by the ￿nancial contracts has non-trivial implications for current (period-1) employment
and production. Before analyzing the ￿nancial contracting problem a detailed description
of the production and information structure is necessary.
Production in period 1 takes place in an environment with a unit-mass continuum of
regions indexed by i, i 2 [0;1]. In region i there is one bank, called bank i, and a unit-
mass continuum of ￿rms indexed by ij, j 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm resides in a distinct location
and is owned by an entrepreneur, who operates a stochastic production technology that
transforms labor and capital services into a homogeneous ￿nal output. The technology of
￿rm ij is represented by the production function
yij = ￿i!ijF (kij;lij); (3)
where yij; kij; and lij denote ￿nal output, capital input, and labor input, respectively,
of ￿rm ij. The function F (￿) is linearly homogeneous, increasing and concave in its two
arguments, and satis￿es the usual Inada conditions. All sources of idiosyncratic risks
are captured in the productivity factor, with ￿i being the random productivity speci￿c
to region i, and !ij the random productivity speci￿c to location ij. We assume that
￿i is identical and independently distributed across regions, with c.d.f. ￿r (￿) and p.d.f.
￿
r (￿), and that !ij is identical and independently distributed across all locations, with
c.d.f. ￿l (￿) and p.d.f. ￿
l (￿). Both ￿i and !ij have non-negative support and unit mean.
Furthermore, ￿i and !￿j, i;￿;j 2 [0;1], are uncorrelated with each other. The distributions
are known by all agents in the economy. Once the ￿rms acquire factor inputs, production
9takes place, and the region and location speci￿c productivities realize. The ￿nal output
is sold in a competitive goods market.
We use the CSV approach of Towsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson
(1986) to model ￿nancial frictions and ￿nancial contracting. It is assumed that there is
an informational asymmetry regarding borrowers￿ex post revenues. In particular, only
borrowers themselves can costlessly observe their realized revenues, while lenders have to
expend a veri￿cation cost in order to observe the same object. In our environment only
￿rm ij can observe at no cost s
f
ij ￿ ￿i!ij, and only bank i can observe ￿i costlessly. For a
bank to observe s
f
ij (or !ij) and for a depositor to observe ￿i, veri￿cation costs have to be
incurred. Note that by lending to a continuum of ￿rms in a particular region each bank
e⁄ectively diversi￿es away all the ￿rm/location speci￿c risks. But the region speci￿c risk
is not diversi￿able, giving rise to the possibility that a bank becomes insolvent when an
adverse regional shock occurs. Our model thus features potential bankruptcy of banks
in addition to bankruptcy of non￿nancial ￿rms. Note that even if the working capital
loans are perfectly safe for the banks (no default by the ￿rms), the depositors still regard
their claims on the banks as being risky due to the informational asymmetry about the
idiosyncratic bank/region productivities.
The concept of ￿regions￿should not be interpreted literally as re￿ ecting geographic
areas, albeit this is certainly one of the many possible interpretations.8 Rather, it is a
device designed to generate risks idiosyncratic to individual banks. If banks are subjected
to risks that cannot be fully diversi￿ed, then the kind of agency problem between banks
and ￿rms applies equally well to the relationship between banks and depositors. In that
8Bank-level risks might stem from geographic con￿nement of an individual bank￿ s operation to speci￿c
areas, as in the U.S. when out-of-state branching was restricted (see Williamson, 1989).
10case there are needs to ￿monitor the monitor,￿in the terminology of Krasa and Villamil
(1992a). It should be noted that even without branching restrictions or regulations on
banks￿lending and investment activities, an individual bank might optimally choose to
limit its scale and/or scope of operation so that the risks associated with its lending
activities are not fully diversi￿ed. See, for example, Krasa and Villamil (1992b) and
Cerasi and Daltung (2000). In this paper we follow Krasa and Villamil (1992a) and Zeng
(2007) to assume that an individual bank cannot contract with a su¢ cient variety of
borrowers so that the credit risks are not perfectly diversi￿able.
2.2 Financial Contracting with Banking Risks
The Two-Sided Debt Contract
The three groups of players in the ￿nancial market￿ ￿rms, banks, and depositors￿
are connected via a two-sided contract structure. Both sides of the contract, one between
the ￿rms and banks and the other between the banks and depositors￿ ￿t into a generic
framework we now describe. Here attention is restricted to deterministic monitoring.9
Since the borrowers (￿rms and banks) are assumed to be risk neutral, the optimal contract
between a generic borrower and a generic lender takes the form of a standard debt contract,
in Gale and Hellwig (1985)￿ s term.
As for the depositors￿attitude toward bank risks, two models are considered in this
paper. In both models each depositor contracts with only one bank, which might be
due to some transaction costs that prevent a depositor from dividing her deposits among
9The assumption of deterministic monitoring is actually less restrictive than it appears. Krasa and
Villamil (2000) articulates a costly enforcement model that justi￿es deterministic monitoring when com-
mitment is limited and enforcement is costly and imperfect. See also Mookherjee and Png (1989) and
Boyd and Smith (1994) on deterministic versus stochastic monitoring.
11many banks in order to diversify her portfolio. The paper is silent on the exact nature and
details of these costs, as our focus is on whether there are risk sharing arrangements that
individual depositors can reply on to handle the consequence of not being able to achieve
full diversi￿cation through splitting deposits.10 In the ￿rst model, which we label ￿Model
A,￿there is no risk-sharing among the depositors so that they remain risk averse with
respect to bank risks. In the second model, ￿Model B,￿there is perfect risk sharing so that
the depositors become e⁄ectively risk neutral with respect to bank risks, despite that each
of them has a strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The analysis in
this paper mainly concerns the ￿nancial and macroeconomic impacts of banking riskiness
shocks under di⁄erent risk-sharing arrangements among the depositors. The two models
considered here represent two opposite extremes, which makes the contrast as stark as
possible.11
Suppose that the borrower￿ s revenue is given by V s, where V is a component freely
observable to the lender, and s ￿ 0 is a unit-mean risky component that is subject to
informational asymmetry, whereby the borrower can costlessly observe s while the lender
has to expend a veri￿cation cost in order to do so. The veri￿cation cost is assumed to
be ￿ times the borrower￿ s revenue, with ￿ 2 (0;1). The c.d.f. of s, given by ￿(￿), is
common knowledge. The contract speci￿es a set of realizations of s for which monitoring
occurs, together with a payment schedule. A standard debt contract with monitoring
10For a paper that explicitly models the costs of ￿nancial transactions and endogenizes lenders￿asset
indivisibility, see Zeng (2007).
11Note that with risk averse depositors standard debt contracts are optimal not only because they
minimize the need for monitoring, but also because they provide optimal risk sharing between the bank
and the depositor. Problems only arise if the borrowers are more risk averse, because it is then optimal
for the lenders to reduce the borrowers￿exposure to risk (see, for example, Hellwig, 2000). To avoid
confusion, the risk sharing arrangements we talk about in this paper refer to those among the depositors
with respect to bank risks.
12threshold ￿ s > 0 has the following features: (i) the monitoring set is fsjs < ￿ sg, (ii) the
￿xed payment is V ￿ s for s 2 fsjs ￿ ￿ sg, and (iii) the payment is V s for s 2 fsjs < ￿ sg.
Resembling many ￿nancial contracts in the real world, the debt contract allows for ￿xed
payment for non-default states and state-contingent payment when default occurs.
Under the standard debt contract, the borrower and the lender each obtains a share




(s ￿ ￿ s)d￿(s), (4)
re￿ ecting the fact that with s above ￿ s; the borrower gives out the ￿xed payment V ￿ s and
keeps the remaining, while with s below ￿ s, all revenues are con￿scated by the lender. The
lender receives V ￿(￿ s;￿) where




When s is larger than or equal to ￿ s, which occurs with probability 1 ￿ ￿(￿ s), the lender
recoups the ￿xed proportion ￿ s of the expected revenue V . If s falls below ￿ s, the lender
takes all of the realized revenue while expending a veri￿cation cost which equals a fraction
￿ of the revenue.12 The following assumption on the distribution of s is imposed.
Assumption 1. (a) The p.d.f ￿(￿) is positive, bounded, and continuously di⁄erentiable
on (0;1), and (b) s￿(s)=[1 ￿ ￿(s)] is an increasing function of s.13
It is easy to show that for ￿ s > 0,
￿
0 (￿ s;￿) = ￿[1 ￿ ￿(￿ s)] < 0;
12Note that ￿(￿ s;￿) + ￿(￿ s;￿) = 1 ￿ ￿
R ￿ s
0 sd￿(s) < 1, indicating that there is a direct deadweight loss
￿
R ￿ s
0 sd￿(s) due to costly monitoring.
13The assumption that s￿(s)=[1 ￿ ￿(s)] is increasing in s is weaker than the increasing hazard as-
sumption commonly made in the incentive contract literature, which requires ￿(s)=[1 ￿ ￿(s)] to be
monotonically increasing in s. Yet the latter property is already satis￿ed by a fairly large class of distri-
butions.
13￿
0 (￿ s;￿) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿ s) ￿ ￿￿ s￿(￿ s) > 0; if ￿ s < ^ s,
and
￿
0 (￿ s;￿) + ￿
0 (￿ s;￿) = ￿￿￿ s￿(￿ s) < 0;
where the primes denote derivatives with respect to ￿ s and ^ s satis￿es 1￿￿(^ s)￿￿^ s￿(^ s) = 0.
We rule out the possibility of credit rationing by requiring V ￿(^ s;￿) to be no less than
the opportunity cost of funds for the lender (see Williamson, 1986). Thus the domain of
￿ s we are interested in is [0; ^ s) and ￿0 (￿ s;￿) > 0 on this interval.14
We now apply this generic debt contract framework to the bank-￿rm relationship.
The ￿rm￿ s revenue can be written as V f!, where V f ￿ PF (k;l)￿ is freely observable to
the bank, and ! is the risk that can be observed by the bank only with a cost.15 The
bank-￿rm contract speci￿es a monitoring threshold, denoted by ￿ !, for the ￿rm/location
speci￿c productivity !. Conditional on the region speci￿c productivity ￿, the expected
return to the ￿rm is then given by PF (k;l)￿￿f ￿
￿ !;￿l￿
and the revenue of the bank from
lending to the ￿rms in its region is PF (k;l)￿￿b ￿
￿ !;￿l￿







for (￿ s;￿) in (4) and (5).16
The contracting problem between the bank and its depositors speci￿es a monitoring
threshold for the bank risk ￿. To ￿t this into the generic setup, write the bank￿ s revenue as
V b￿, where V b ￿ PF (k;l)￿b ￿
￿ !;￿l￿
. Here ￿ !￿ the monitoring threshold speci￿ed explic-
itly in the bank-￿rm contract￿ is freely observable to both the bank and the depositors.
Let ￿ ￿ represent the monitoring threshold for ￿ in the bank-depositor contract. Then the
14If the lender has logarithmic utility then the relevant ^ s is the one that maximizes the function ~ ￿
de￿ned in (15) below.
15From the bank￿ s perspective, monitoring sf ￿ ￿! is equivalent to monitoring ! given its information
in ￿.
16By the law of large numbers, the revenue of the bank from lending to all of the ￿rms in its region is
the same as the expected revenue from lending to one ￿rm, the expectation taken over the distribution
of ! and conditional on ￿.
14expected return to the bank from the contract is V b￿b ￿￿ ￿;￿r￿
and the expected return to
the depositors is V b￿d ￿￿ ￿;￿r￿
, where ￿b ￿￿ ￿;￿r￿
and ￿d ￿￿ ￿;￿r￿
obtain from substituting
￿￿ ￿;￿r￿
for (￿ s;￿) in (4) and (5). Note, however, that if the depositors are risk averse
with respect to bank risks (as is the case in Model A), what the depositors care is their
expected utility, which obviously di⁄ers from the expected ￿nancial return o⁄ered by the
contract. Details are provided in the next subsection.
Optimal Competitive Contract
To motivate competitive banking assume that although a bank can lend only to the
￿rms within one region, there is no restriction on which region this might be (free region
entry). As a result each bank o⁄ers contracts that maximize the expected return to the
￿rms in its region of operation such that the bank itself at least earns the riskless return
on its own funds. The optimal competitive contract is formally stated as solving the
problem below (recall that the risk-free interest rate is normalized to be one). To simplify

























































15where 0 ￿ Nd ￿ Md. Here P1F (k;l)￿f (￿ !) is the expected return to the ￿rm, uncondi-
tional on ￿, from the contract in period 1. Dividing this by the period-2 price level P2
yields the ￿rm￿ s expected consumption and hence expected utility. Inequality (6) is the
individual rationality (IR) constraint for the bank, which says that the bank must obtain
at least what it can earn by investing all of its own funds in the riskless security. The
amount of the bank￿ s ￿nancial capital equals the rental value of the physical capital stock
it owns plus its after-transfer money balance, Mb. That is, Nb ￿ RkKb + Mb.
Inequality (7), the IR constraint for the depositors, needs some explanation. A depos-




in the risk-free security, though in equilibrium Md = Nd because of the




from the risk-free investment. When ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, which occurs with prob-
ability 1￿￿r ￿￿ ￿
￿
, the depositor receives ￿xed payment P1F (k;l)￿b (￿ !)￿ ￿ from the deposit
contract and utility level U
￿






sumption. When ￿ < ￿ ￿, the depositor receives P1F (k;l)￿b (￿ !)￿(1 ￿ ￿), net of monitoring
costs, fromthe deposit contract and utility level U
￿






The expected utility from the portfolio
￿
Nd;Md ￿ Nd￿
must be no less than putting all of





lem 1 the applicable functional form for U (￿) depends on the risk-sharing arrangement
among the depositors. For Model A U (￿) is logarithmic, while for Model B it is linear.
Finally, inequality (8) is the ￿ ow-of-funds constraint for the ￿rms. The total bill for
the ￿rms￿factor inputs is Rkk +Wl, which has to be covered by the internal funds of the
￿rms themselves, Nf ￿ RkKf, and bank loans that equal the sum of bank capital Nb
16and deposits Nd. In Problem 1 Nf and Nb are taken as given.











Let the model-indicator function ￿(I) equal 1 if I = A and 0 if I = B. As shown in
the Appendix, the solution to Problem 1 satis￿es the conditions listed below, where we
impose the equilibrium condition Md ￿ Nd = 0 to simplify notations, without neglecting




























































￿ ~ ￿d0 ￿￿ ￿
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Equations (9) and (10) are the ￿rst-order conditions for factor demand, where the
presence of the factor q creates wedges between the marginal products of factor inputs
and their real prices (q takes the value qI in Model I, I 2 fA;Bg). We shall call q the
17￿nancial friction indicator, as it re￿ ects the distortions caused by the agency problems





strictly greater than one. Here ￿ ! > 0 indicates a positive default rate by the ￿rms and
re￿ ects the agency cost in the bank-￿rm relationship. This is what the existing literature
on credit market imperfections has typically focused on. On the other hand, ￿ ￿ > 0
corresponds to a positive rate of default by the banks (to the depositors) and re￿ ects





overall distortions caused by the conventionally studied credit frictions and the sort of
banking frictions we introduce. All aspects of ￿nancial frictions that are relevant for the
determination of employment are captured by q. In the model￿ s general equilibrium to be
described below, q is a su¢ cient statistic for equilibrium employment. Note that q is an
increasing function of ￿ ! and ￿ ￿, with lim￿ !;￿ ￿!0 q = 1 in both models.
Equations (11) and (12) re￿ ect the fact that the optimal competitive contract entails
binding IR constraints for both the bank and the depositors. Essentially, the terms of
contract dictate a division of expected revenues between borrowers and lenders. Since








is increasing in ￿ ￿, equation (11) indicates that
the bank￿ s default probability increases along with ￿ ￿ when it has a larger debt-equity
ratio ￿
b. The increase in ￿ ￿ implies a larger share of expected revenues received by the
depositors, relative to the share received by the bank, in the bank-depositor contract.
Equation (12) indicates that given ￿
b and ￿ ￿, the ￿rms￿default probability increases along
with ￿ ! when their debt-equity ratio ￿
f increases. The increase in ￿ ! implies a larger share
of expected revenues that goes to the ￿rms in the bank-￿rm contract.
182.3 General Equilibrium
To make the analysis tractable we further assume that the production function F (￿) takes
the standard Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., F (K;L) = K￿L1￿￿, ￿ 2 (0;1). This immediately
implies, via (9) and (10), that (1 ￿ ￿)RkK = ￿WL. Using this relationship, together
with Nd = Md, Nb = RkKb+Mb, the equality version of the ￿ ow-of-funds constraint (8),
























are the fractions of (M ￿ Mw) possessed by the banks and depositors, respectively, with
zb+zd = 1. The pair
￿
zb;zd￿
represents the distribution of initial money balances between
the banks and depositors.
With ￿
b and ￿
f given by (17), equations (11) and (12) determine the equilibrium values
of the default thresholds ￿ ￿ and ￿ !. Given ￿ ￿, ￿ ! (hence q), and the real wage rate ￿, the








An important implication of equation (18) is that the ￿nancial friction indicator q is a
su¢ cient statistic for the determination of equilibrium employment L.
Furthermore, output and consumption in period 1 (by the workers) is given by

























< 1 for ￿ !;￿ ￿ > 0, indicating a direct deadweight
loss due to costly monitoring.




, with M ￿ Mb +Md +Mw, then the aspect of this distribution
that is relevant for allocations is simply the division of (M ￿ Mw) between Mb and Md,






, the only role of M is to determine the
price level P1 = M=C1 through the quantity equation (2). Since the total nominal wage
bill is WL = ￿P1L and must equal Mb + Md in a cleared loan market, the relationship
M
w = M ￿ ￿P1L (21)
must hold for the speci￿cation of the initial distribution to be internally consistent. Equa-
tion (21) can be seen as a model-consistent rule that the government uses to determine




. The initial distribution of purchasing powers









of period-1 ￿nancial contract determine the division of C2 among the entre-
preneurs, bankers, and depositors, who only consume in period 2. The share of period-2
purchasing power possessed by each type of agents equals the share of revenues that goes
to that type of agents as dictated by the period-1 contract. Hence total entrepreneurial
consumption C
f
2, banker consumption Cb
2, and depositor consumption Cd



























20Formally, a competitive equilibrium with banking frictions and two-sided ￿nancial























, the period-1 contract terms and allocations, ￿ !; ￿ ￿; L; and C1, are
determined by (11)-(12), with ￿
b and ￿
f given by (17), and (18)-(19).
(2) Given M, the price levels P1 and P2 are determined by the quantity equations,
i.e., P1 = M=C1 and P2 = M=C2. In addition W = ￿P1 and Rk = ￿WL=(1 ￿ ￿).








is given by (22).





3 Banking Riskiness and Aggregate Fluctuations
3.1 The Default versus Risk E⁄ects of Banking Riskiness Shocks
In this section we introduce the concept of banking riskiness shocks and study their ef-
fects under di⁄erent risk-sharing arrangements among the depositors. Our formulation
of these shocks parallels the formulation of entrepreneurial riskiness shocks in the ear-
lier work of Williamson (1987) and the recent work of Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2003, 2009). These authors consider the CSV problem between banks and non￿nan-
cial ￿rms but not the problem between banks and depositors. In the inspiring work of
Williamson (1987), savers delegate monitoring of entrepreneurs to a large ￿nancial inter-
mediary, which perfectly diversi￿es away all of the credit risks and is able to guarantee the
depositors a risk-free return. There are thus agency costs between the entrepreneurs and
the ￿nancial intermediary, but no such costs between the ￿nancial intermediary and the
21depositors. In that environment stochastic changes in the riskiness of the entrepreneurs￿
projects generate aggregate ￿ uctuations, ￿ uctuations that would not obtain were there no
costly monitoring on the outcomes of the entrepreneurial projects. In his model, however,
banking frictions (i.e., agency costs between ￿nancial intermediaries and depositors) are
absent, leaving no role for stochastic changes in banking riskiness to play. This abstrac-
tion might be innocuous for episodes where banking frictions are not severe enough to
deserve attention. Yet the experience of the GFC pinpoints the importance of banking
frictions and stochastic changes in the riskiness of banking.
In this paper we assume that the bank/region speci￿c productivity ￿ follows a unit-







, where N stands for
the normal distribution.17 In our model, it is the costly veri￿cation of ￿ that gives rise
to equilibrium bankruptcy of banks. The default rate of banks tends to zero as ￿￿ tends
to zero from the right. When ￿￿ equals zero, the distribution of ￿ becomes degenerate,
and the informational asymmetry between the banks and the depositors disappears. The
dispersion parameter ￿￿ captures the extent of the riskiness of banking. Here we allow ￿￿
to be random. Speci￿cally, its realization is given by
￿￿ = ￿ ￿￿ + "; (23)
where the mean level of riskiness, ￿ ￿￿, is a positive constant, and " is a random disturbance
bounded away from ￿￿ ￿￿. We interpret " as the banking riskiness shock.
In our view, shocks to banking riskiness are highly relevant in the light of the erratic
behavior of the interest rate spreads on banks￿external ￿nance, and especially so during
the recent GFC. The historical average of the spread between the 3-month certi￿cate of
17The distribution is completed by assigning a zero p.d.f. for ￿ = 0.
22deposits (CD) rate and the 3-month T-bill rate was about 75 basis points (annualized),
based on a sample period from 1973Q1 to 2009Q4. From 2001Q1 to 2007Q2, the spread
averaged only 27 basis points. In contrast, its average in the second half of 2007 and
the year of 2008 rose to as high as 153 basis points, with a spike at 252 basis points in
the fourth quarter of 2008. In our model, there is a direct linkage between the extent
of banking riskiness and the external ￿nance premium faced by the banks. The gross
interest rate at which the banks borrow from the depositors is simply the non-default
payment speci￿ed in the bank-depositor contract divided by the amount of deposits, i.e.,
Rb = P1F (K;L)￿b (￿ !)￿ ￿=Nd. Using the binding IR constraint for the bank, equation







￿ 1 (recall again that the risk-free rate is normalized to be unity).18 Other
things equal, an increase in ￿￿ raises Rb, and ￿ uctuations in banking riskiness give rise to
￿ uctuations in the spread. Shocks to banking riskiness seem to be more important than
shocks to entrepreneurial riskiness during the GFC, as there was a sharp increase in the
spread between the bank CD rate and the T-bill rate, but not in the spread between the
bank lending rate and the CD rate (Figure 1a).
What are the ￿nancial and macroeconomic consequences of shocks to banking risk-
iness? The answer to this question hinges on the way the ￿nancial friction indicator
q￿ the su¢ cient statistic for the determination of employment￿ responds to the shocks.
The way q responds, in turn, depends on the prevailing risk sharing arrangements among
the depositors. An important point to notice is that with imperfect risk sharing (Model
A) the response of q and hence employment L includes both a pure default e⁄ect and







+ ￿d ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿ 1.
23a risk e⁄ect, while with perfect risk sharing (Model B) only the pure default e⁄ect is
present. The pure default e⁄ect results from the fact that the optimal contract dictates
equilibrium bankruptcy of banks. This e⁄ect will be present as long as the banks￿default
rate changes with the shock, even when the depositors are risk neutral with respect to
banking risks. The risk e⁄ect results from the fact that the payment streams under the
optimal contract are uncertain for the depositors. This e⁄ect obtains when risk sharing
among the depositors is imperfect so that they remain risk averse with respect to banking
risks.
In this paper we propose a model-based approach to decompose the overall e⁄ect of a
banking riskiness shock into the pure default e⁄ect and the risk e⁄ect. Speci￿cally, two
measures are developed to assess these e⁄ects: a within-model measure and a between-
model measure. We take the imperfect risk sharing model￿ Model A￿ to be the ￿true￿
model, as perfect risk sharing seems to be less realistic. When the realization of the
banking riskiness shock is ", the equilibrium value of the ￿nancial friction indicator is given
by q (") = qA
￿





￿ !A (");￿ ￿
A (")
￿
denotes the default thresholds
in the equilibrium of Model A with banking riskiness shock ", and the functional form of
qA (￿) is given by (13). De￿ne the within-model pure default component of q (") as
q








where the functional form of qB (￿) is given by (14). The residual of q (") over qD ("jA) is






















































where the speci￿c forms for the functions in the second line are understood to depend on
". Note that the risk component qR ("jA) depends only on the bank default threshold and
not on the ￿rm default threshold.
When the banking riskiness shock changes from " to "0, our within-model measures of












respectively. Obviously the e⁄ect of the shock on logq is exactly the sum of the above
two e⁄ects. In the light of condition (18), the within-model measures of the pure default
and risk e⁄ects of the banking riskiness shock on equilibrium employment L are naturally
￿1=￿ times the corresponding e⁄ects on q.
The within-model measures described above rely on using the equilibrium default
thresholds prevailing in Model A. Clearly, with the same realization of banking riskiness




will vary from one model to the other. Our between-model
measures take this into account. Let
￿
￿ !B (");￿ ￿
B (")
￿
denote the default thresholds in
the equilibrium of Model B (perfect risk sharing) with banking riskiness shock ". The
25between-model pure default component of q (") = qA
￿























￿ !B (");￿ ￿
B (");"
￿.
This between-model measure of the risk component of q re￿ ects not only that imper-
fect risk sharing creates severer ￿nancial distortions for the same values of the default
thresholds, but also that the equilibrium default thresholds themselves will change once
we switch from perfect risk sharing to imperfect risk sharing.
When the banking riskiness shock changes from " to "0, our between-model measures












respectively. The e⁄ect of the shock on logq is exactly the sum of these two e⁄ects. Again,
the pure default and risk e⁄ects of the banking riskiness shock on equilibrium employment
are ￿1=￿ times the corresponding e⁄ects on q.
3.2 Quantitative Evaluations
To evaluate quantitatively the default and risk e⁄ects of banking riskiness shocks on the
￿nancial friction indicator and the level of employment, we calibrate Model A as follows.
Let a time period correspond to a quarter. The weight of leisure relative to consumption
26in worker utility, ￿, is chosen to deliver L = 1=3 absent shocks and frictions. The elasticity
parameter in the production function, ￿, is set to be 1=2, implying an asset-net worth
ratio of about 2 for the ￿rms (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999).19 Normalizing
K = 1 and Kb = 0, the value of zb is set to be 0:076, which matches the historical
average of an asset-net worth ratio of 13:18 for U.S. commercial banks.20 The monitoring
cost parameter, ￿, is set to be 0:36.21 Similar to the bank/region speci￿c productivity,
we assume that the ￿rm/location speci￿c productivity ! follows a unit-mean log-normal







. To isolate the e⁄ects of banking riskiness shocks,
we assume that ￿! is ￿xed, while ￿￿ follows the speci￿cation in (23) and is therefore
subjected to stochastic disturbances. The value of ￿! and the mean value of ￿￿, ￿ ￿￿, are
chosen to match (1) an annualized spread between the ￿rms￿borrowing rate and the risk-
free rate of 293 basis points, and (2) an annualized spread between the banks￿borrowing
rate and the risk-free rate of 75 basis points.22
Figures 3 and 4 depict the e⁄ects of banking riskiness shocks on the ￿nancial friction
indicator q and employment L. Figure 3 shows the e⁄ects of the shocks relative to the
frictionless economy, where q = 1 (hence logq = 0) identically. The top-left part shows
the value of q (") (solid line), the within-model measure of its pure default component
qD ("jA) (dashed line), and the between-model measure of that component qD ("jB) (dash-
dot line), all expressed in log and multiplied by one hundred. The gap between the solid
19If the variable K in the production function were interpreted literally as ￿physical capital￿ , then 1=2
would be too large a value for ￿. Nevertheless, a broader interpretation may be adopted: the variable
may be thought to include bank and ￿rm managers￿human capital, e.g., managerial skills, as well.
20This calculation is based on ￿Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States￿of
the Federal Reserve. The sample period is 1973Q1-2009Q4.
21By comparing the value of a ￿rm as a going concern with its liquidation value, Alderson and Betker
(1995) estimate that liquidation costs are equal to approximately 36 percent of ￿rms assets.
22The empirical measures of the risk-free rate, the banks￿borrowing rate, and the ￿rms￿borrowing rate
are the 3-month T-bill rate, the 3-month CD rate, and the prime lending rate, respectively. The data are
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The sample period is again 1973Q1-2009Q4.
27line and the dashed (resp. dash-dot) line represents the within (resp. between)-model
measure of the risk component. The bottom-left part plots the corresponding e⁄ects on
log employment relative to the value that would prevail with q = 1, also expressed in
percentage points. The right parts of the ￿gure illustrate the percent contributions by
the pure default components to the overall e⁄ects of banking riskiness shocks.
[Insert Figures 3 & 4 about here.]
As is apparent from the ￿gure, the e⁄ect of a positive (resp. negative) shock to
banking riskiness is to raise (resp. lower) q and reduce (resp. increase) employment L.
The e⁄ects are asymmetric around " = 0 in that the e⁄ects of positive shocks are stronger.
This is because negative shocks drive the economy toward the situation without banking
frictions, which provides the limit for the strength of the e⁄ects. When a negative shock is
su¢ ciently large, virtually 100% of q is made of the pure default component. As the shock
gets larger in algebraic value, the risk component gains importance at the expense of the
pure default component, with the between-model measure of the contribution by the pure
default component somewhat larger than the corresponding within-model measure. At
the mean level of riskiness (" = 0), the contribution by the pure default component is
88% by the within measure and 90% by the between measure. When the shock reaches
" = 0:07, which is particularly interesting since it generates a bank spread of about 250
basis points per annum￿ the highest point during the GFC, the contribution by the pure
default component is 82% by the within measure and 85% by the between measure.
Figure 4 shows the e⁄ects of banking riskiness shocks (" 6= 0) relative to the mean level
of riskiness (" = 0, or ￿￿ = ￿ ￿￿). The e⁄ects on q plotted in the ￿gure include the overall
e⁄ect logq (") ￿ log(q (0)) and the within (resp. between)-model measure of the pure
28default e⁄ect, i.e., DE (0;"jA) (resp. DE (0;"jB)), all expressed in percentage points.
The gap between the overall e⁄ect and a particular measure of the pure default e⁄ect is
the associated risk e⁄ect. As discussed earlier, the e⁄ects on log employment are simply
￿1=￿ times the e⁄ects on q, the percent contributions by the pure default e⁄ect versus
the risk e⁄ect being the same for these two variables. For the range of banking riskiness
shocks shown in the ￿gure, the pure default e⁄ect contributes about 73% to the overall
e⁄ect according to the within measure, and about 77% according to the between measure.
When " = 0:07, which generates a bank spread similar in value to the one present in the
fourth quarter of 2008, the overall e⁄ect of the banking riskiness shock, relative to the
mean level of riskiness, is a decline in employment by 6:57 percent. According to our
decomposition, the pure default e⁄ect leads to a 4:76 percent employment decline by
the within measure, and a 5:05 decline by the between measure. On the other hand,
the risk e⁄ect produces a 1:81 percent employment decline by the within measure, and
a 1:52 percent decline by the between measure. Although the pure default e⁄ects are
quantitatively more important, the risk e⁄ects are not to be neglected.
4 Conclusions
This paper develops a model of banking frictions and banking riskiness, the importance of
which is highlighted by the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC). A model-based approach
is proposed to decompose the e⁄ect of a banking riskiness shock into a pure default e⁄ect
and a risk e⁄ect. Although the default e⁄ect is quantitatively more important, the risk
e⁄ect is not to be neglected. When the shock generates a bank spread similar in value to
the peak during the GFC, the overall e⁄ect is a decline in employment by 6:57 percent.
29The pure default e⁄ect leads to a 4:76 percent employment decline by a within-model
measure, and a 5:05 decline by a between-model measure. The remaining is attributed to
the risk e⁄ect.
We conclude by suggesting two directions for future research. First our analysis can
be extended to include ￿deposit rationing￿as a possible equilibrium outcome so that an-
other dimension in which banking riskiness shocks exert in￿ uence on the economy can be
explored. Credit rationing, whereby entrepreneurs are unable to obtain the bank loans
they desire, has been extensively studied in the literature by, for example, Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and Williamson (1986). This type of rationing happens on the asset side
of the bank balance sheet. A di⁄erent type of rationing can happen on the liability side
of the bank balance sheet, whereby banks are unable to take in the amount of deposits
they desire. The latter type of rationing will be an interesting topic to explore in fu-
ture research. Second, entrepreneurial riskiness shocks, as analyzed in Williamson (1987)
and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003, 2009), can be considered in tandem with
banking riskiness shocks. Both kinds of shocks are likely to be relevant for ￿nancial and
macroeconomic ￿ uctuations, but their relative importance might vary from one episode
to another. Furthermore, it is possible that these two kinds of shocks are correlated with
each other. Investigating the role they play jointly is an important direction for business
cycle studies.
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32Appendix. Derivation of the Optimality Conditions
for Problem 1.
Model A
We ￿rst show that conditions (9)-(12) hold. In the derivation below we impose the fact
that Md ￿ Nd = 0 in equilibrium to simplify notations, without neglecting the necessity





d be the Lagrangian
multipliers for (6) and (7), respectively. With U (￿) taking the log form, the ￿rst-order































Equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply
￿
b =





￿ ~ ￿d0 ￿￿ ￿
￿












￿ ~ ￿d0 ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿b0 ￿￿ ￿
￿i: (A.4)












￿f (￿ !) + ￿







Substitution of (A.3) and (A.4) into the above de￿nition gives the expression of q in terms
of ￿ ! and ￿ ￿ as in (13), with I = A.























Substituting (A.5) into (A.6) yields (11) with I = A.
To derive (12), note that the linear homogeneity of F (￿) together with (9) and (10)
imply






Substituting (A.7) and the equality version of (8) into (A.5) yields (12).
33We then show that lim￿ !;￿ ￿!0 q = 1 and that q increases with ￿ ! and ￿ ￿, hence q > 1 for
































Look at the term %(￿ !). We have [%(￿ !)]
￿1 < 1 or %(￿ !) > 1 for all ￿ ! > 0 since
￿￿b0 (￿ !)=￿f0 (￿ !) < 1 and ￿f (￿ !)+￿b (￿ !) < 1. Also, lim￿ !!0 [%(￿ !)]
￿1 = 1 since lim￿ !!0
￿
￿￿b0 (￿ !)=￿f0 (￿ !)
￿
= 1 and lim￿ !!0
￿
￿f (￿ !) + ￿b (￿ !)
￿


















f00 (￿ !) ￿ ￿
b00 (￿ !)￿

















To sign the above expression we consider two cases. Case 1: lim￿ !!0 ￿
l (￿ !) > 0. In this case
lim￿ !!0
￿
￿b0 (￿ !)￿f00 (￿ !) ￿ ￿b00 (￿ !)￿f0 (￿ !)
￿
= ￿￿lim￿ !!0 ￿
l (￿ !) < 0. Case 2: lim￿ !!0 ￿
l (￿ !) =
0. But Assumption 1(a) requires ￿
l (￿) to be positive, bounded, and continuously di⁄er-
entiable on (0;1). Hence in this case we must have lim￿ !!0 ￿
l0 (￿ !) > 0. This means that
for ￿ ! positive and su¢ ciently close to 0, we have ￿
l (￿ !) > 0 and ￿
l0 (￿ !) > 0 and hence ￿
￿b0 (￿ !)￿f00 (￿ !) ￿ ￿b00 (￿ !)￿f0 (￿ !)
￿
< 0. In both cases when ￿ ! is positive and su¢ ciently
close to 0, we have @%￿1=@￿ ! < 0 and hence @q=@￿ ! > 0.
Now look at the term {
￿￿ ￿
￿



















































































































￿j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
denotes the truncated expectation of ￿, with lim￿ ￿!0 E
￿
￿j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
= 1.
To sign this derivative consider two cases. Case 1. lim￿ ￿!0 ￿
r ￿￿ ￿
￿




=d￿ < 0. Case 2. lim￿ ￿!0 ￿
r ￿￿ ￿
￿




implied by Assumption 1(a), which requires ￿
r (￿) to be positive, bounded, and continu-











= 1. Hence for ￿ ￿ positive and su¢ ciently close to
zero we have ￿r ￿￿ ￿
￿
dominated by the negative terms and hence dG
￿￿ ￿
￿




=d￿ < 0 in the neighborhood of ￿ ￿ = 0. Also,
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To sign this derivative again consider two cases. Case 1. lim￿ ￿!0 ￿
r ￿￿ ￿
￿








this case lim￿ ￿!0 ￿
r0 ￿￿ ￿
￿
> 0 as implied by Assumption 1(a). This means that for ￿ ￿ positive






are positive, hence dH
￿￿ ￿
￿























r (￿)d￿ ￿ 0:
We therefore conclude that d{￿1=d￿ ￿ < 0 or d{=d￿ ￿ > 0 and hence @q=@￿ ￿ > 0 in the




d be the Lagrangian multipliers for (6) and (7), respectively. With
U (￿) taking the linear form, the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ￿ ! and ￿ ￿ are
￿


































































35Substitution of (B.3) and (B.4) into the above de￿nition gives the expression of q in terms
of ￿ ! and ￿ ￿ as in (14), with I = B.













Substituting (B.5) into (B.6) yields (11) with I = B. The derivation of (12) is the same
as in Model A.









￿￿b0 (￿ !)=￿f0 (￿ !)
￿







































= 1, lim￿ !!0
￿







+ ￿d ￿￿ ￿
￿￿
= 1, lim￿ !!0
￿
￿f (￿ !) + ￿b (￿ !)
￿
= 1, we have lim￿ !;￿ ￿!0 q￿1 = 1.





















The proof of @q=@￿ ! > 0 follows that in Model A. The proof of @q=@￿ ￿ > 0 also follows






a.  Interest rate spreads (in basis points per annum) 
Solid: Prime lending rate minus 3-month T-bill rate; Dashed: 3-month bank CD rate minus 3-month 
T-bill rate; Dash-dot: prime lending rate minus 3-month bank CD rate. 
 
 











Figure 1. Interest rate spreads and bank failure 

































































Figure 2. Flow of funds in the model 
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